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GLOBAL BUSINESS NORMS AND ISLAMIC VIEWS OF WOMEN’S 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
Abstract:  This paper examines the issue of gender equality within Islam in order to develop an 
ethical framework for businesses operating in Muslim majority countries. We pay attention to the 
role of women and seemingly inconsistent expectations of Islamic and western societies with 
regard to appropriate gender roles. In particular, we contrast a mainstream western liberal 
individualist view of freedom and equality—the capability approach, used here as an illustration 
of mainstream western liberalism—with an egalitarian Islamic view on gender equality. While 
the paper identifies an opportunity for this particular approach to reform patriarchal 
interpretations and practices of Islam toward gender egalitarian interpretations and practices, it 
also contests the notions of adaptation and well-being inherent within the capability approach. 
We suggest that a dialectical approach to understanding the relationships among religion, culture, 
and business provides a better guide to responsible business action in Muslim Majority countries 
than does the capability approach 
 
Keywords: adaptation, capability approach, gender equality, Islam, Muslim women, well-being.  
 
I. Introduction 
Issues related to gender discrimination are important for organizations (Karam & Jamali, 2013; 
Kelan, 2008; Mayer & Cava, 1993; Özbilgin et al., 2012; Young, 1990). Globalization brings 
together different business systems and societal cultures (Bayes & Tohidi, 2001; Metcalfe & 
Rees, 2010) and different cultures conceptualize the socially appropriate role of women 
differently. Organizations operating in the United States and Europe, for example, face broadly 
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agreed upon norms that support equal opportunity for women. The popular model in 
industrialized countries in the west is equal employment opportunity, which is based on the 
notion that there must be no gender discrimination or gender segregation in employment and 
other areas of public life. Organizations operating in many other countries may face broadly 
agreed upon social norms that support different roles for women; these roles may be seen by 
people living in the United States and Europe as discriminatory and subordinate to patriarchy. 
More to the point, what gender equality means in practical terms is a subject of considerable 
debate, and especially so when considering how cultures and societies differ. Does gender 
equality mean that women and men should have the exact same roles in society, without any 
differentiation? Does it mean that all positions within society are open on equal terms to men and 
women? Does it mean that women and men are equal in some contexts (such as the workplace) 
and not in others (such as the home or within religious institutions)? There are myriad variations 
that can and do occur with regard to gender roles within and across countries. It might be 
possible, for example, to develop a framework in which women have equal access to 
employment opportunities, if they choose them, while playing a more subordinate role to men 
within the household, a situation which is common among American evangelical Christians 
(Gallagher & Smith, 1999). 
 
One of the most contested ethical issues for businesses is thus whether gender equality is a 
culturally neutral norm that all businesses and cultures ought to follow in every locale where 
they have operations. Mayer and Cava (1993) suggest that a western perspective on gender 
equality should not be treated as ethical imperialism (treating one’s own ethical standards as 
normative for all cultures in all times and places) in any pejorative sense and is therefore 
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preferable to a moral relativist approach (proposing ethical standards are relative only to one’s 
culture because there are no moral absolutes). However, not all cultures may subscribe to a 
particular set of principles and instead may prefer their own views on gender equality and the 
appropriate role of women in society (Syed & Ali, 2011). Within Islam, for example, there seems 
to be an emphasis on diversity and complementarity of sex roles, rather than on exact sameness 
of women and men in all spheres of life. Islam declares that a man is responsible for 
economically supporting his family members, including his wife and children, while placing a 
high value on a woman’s role as mothers (Hussain, 1987). According to a hadith (a report of the 
deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad): “Every man is a shepherd to his family, and a 
woman is the custodian of her husband’s house and his children” (reported in Bukhari, 1959). 
Sidani and Thornberry (2013: 76) note that Islamic laws and social practices emphasize the role 
of the family in its extended form and encourage a set of obligations and expectations among 
family members. Also, Islam requires its followers to observe modesty; this requires a particular 
code of dress and interaction between non-mehram (i.e., not related) women and men (Quran 24: 
31)1.  
 
Businesses headquartered in the United States and Europe (among other countries in which 
gender equality is an expected norm) operating in Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in which 
gender equality is conceptualized differently therefore face a dilemma. On the one hand, they 
generally want to support norms of gender equality consistent with their home cultures and their 
stakeholders’ expectations, as well as with legal requirements of their home countries. On the 
other hand, they want to be respectful of local or host cultures, especially when culture and 
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religion are mutually reinforcing. The tension between norms thought to be universal and local 
cultural autonomy is a consistent theme in the business ethics literature. 
 
In this paper, we seek to explore the issue of gender equality within Islam in order to develop an 
ethical framework for businesses operating in MMCs. Our focus is on the role of women and 
seemingly contradictory expectations of Islamic and non-Islamic societies with regard to 
appropriate gender roles. In particular, we contrast a particular western liberal individualist view 
of freedom and equality—the capability approach, used here as an illustration of mainstream 
western liberalism—with an egalitarian Islamic view on gender equality. Pioneered by economist 
and philosopher Amartya Sen and developed further by philosopher Martha Nussbaum, the 
capability approach offers an explicit ethics of well-being and equality, which scholars have 
generally applied in the context of international development (e.g., Gagnon & Cornelius, 2000; 
Robeyns, 2002). In the last few decades, the capability approach has become highly influential as 
a philosophical framework for development policy at various international forums, including the 
United Nations where it has shaped the evolution of the human development index and gender 
development index.  
 
We offer a partial counterview in this paper that emphasizes an egalitarian reading of Islamic 
theology. Rather than simply rejecting the capability approach as “too western” or “too secular,” 
we seek here to illustrate how Islamic tradition and practice might usefully critique a western-
centric orientation of the capability approach while the capability approach simultaneously 
critiques particular patriarchal interpretations of and practices in Islamic tradition. In this pursuit, 
we follow the dialectical approach developed by Benson (1977) and expanded upon by Seo and 
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Creed (2002). We also draw upon Gallagher and Smith’s (1999) work in which conservative 
religious traditions often combine symbolic traditionalism and pragmatic egalitarianism, which 
further supports our proposal that a dialectical approach is useful with regard to gender, the 
capability approach and Islamic culture. We conclude with a discussion of implications for 
practice and future research. 
 
II. Global business norms and women’s employment 
Modern western approaches to women’s employment are generally dominated by discourses and 
public policies related to equal opportunity and diversity management. Many countries have 
formulated laws to implement gender equality at work to ensure that women do not face any type 
of discrimination or harassment in the workplace. Organizations in such countries have in turn 
largely adopted the discourse of equal opportunity and diversity management for several reasons: 
to comply with legal requirements, to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of organizational 
stakeholders (Suchman, 1995), and to ensure that positions in organizations are occupied by the 
people who are most qualified to hold them. Scholarship on diversity and equal opportunity in 
modern societies such as the US, the UK and Australia has highlighted a number of key 
obstructions in the way of equal opportunity, including but not limited to gender stereotypes, 
occupational segregation, pay gaps and the glass ceiling (Powell & Butterfield, 1994; Syed & 
Murray, 2008; Tatli et al., 2013).  
 
Islam, women and modernity 
The term “modernity” has been used to refer to a world constructed anew through the active and 
conscious intervention of individuals (Giddens, 1990; 1991). In modern societies, the world is 
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experienced as a human construction, an experience that gives rise to not only a new sense of 
freedom but also to a basic anxiety about the future (Eyerman, 1992). Seen from this angle, 
modernity is concerned with capitalism, industrialism, urbanism, and the democratic nation-state.  
It may also be seen as a breakdown of social values, traditional social order, and moral regulation 
(Durkheim, in Lukes, 1985).  
 
In conceptualizing modernity, Weber (1958) focuses on the rationalization of the world where a 
society becomes dominated by norms of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control. This 
results in dehumanizing rationalization where the average person is less important than the clock 
and the calculator. The most defining property of modernity, according to Giddens, is that we are 
disembedded from time and space. In pre-modern (or traditional) societies, space was the area in 
which one moved; time was the experience one had while moving. In modern societies, however, 
the social space is no longer confined by the boundaries set by the space in which one moves 
(Giddens, 1990, 1991). However, we argue in this paper that an imaginative character of 
modernity and its dissociation from time and space may be problematic, for example, in cross-
national transportation of ideologies and practices of equal opportunity.  
 
Also of relevance here is Tönnies’s (1971) distinction between societies based on Gemeinschaft 
(i.e., traditional community) and on Gesellschaft (i.e., modern commercial society). 
Gemeinschaft may by exemplified historically by a family or a neighborhood in a pre-modern (or 
traditional) society; Gesellschaft by a joint-stock corporation or a state in a modern society. The 
Gesellschaft relationships in an urban and capitalist setting are characterized by individualism 
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and impersonal monetary interests. Social ties in a Gesellschaft context are often instrumental 
and superficial, with self-interest and exploitation increasingly the norm.  
 
We argue that western-centric framing of gender equality at work may face some issues and 
challenges when organizations seek to expand their businesses to non-western countries. We 
focus our attention in this paper on ethical and ideological issues that a western (or modern) 
framing of equal opportunity may confront in MMCs. There are two reasons for our focus on this 
topic. First, with a population of more than 1.6 billion followers, Islam is the second largest 
religion in the world (DeSilver, 2013); 56 countries of the world today are members of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Second, Islam and Muslims are generally viewed 
(particularly in the west) as having an approach to gender relations much different from a 
western, liberal approach to equal opportunity.  
 
The capability approach 
As an exemplar of western philosophy, we focus on the capability approach and highlight some 
of the same tensions that exist between this particular approach and Islam, with a view to 
revealing any potential tendencies of contemporary business as points of tension with Islamic 
theology and interpretation. 
 
In their description of the capability approach, particularly in their critiques of happiness and 
desire-fulfillment views of well-being, Sen and Nussbaum frequently refer to the notion of 
“adaptation.” Sen (1992) notes that people who persistently live in adverse situations suffering 
different forms of deprivation may notwithstanding be happy or satisfied with their 
circumstances. Satisfaction for such persons may provide an inadequate informational space for 
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well-being and quality-of-life evaluations. Nussbaum (2000) argues that long-term 
discrimination such as sex bias may affect individuals’ values. She tackles this issue in her 
analysis of the limitations of subjective welfarism. 
 
Sen’s concerns about adaptation apply forcefully in the context of gender (in)equality (Qizilbash, 
2006: 28). For example, women living in a highly inequitable society may be able to pursue only 
a very limited range of opportunity. Once having become accustomed to the inequities embedded 
in their society, they may find they enjoy what they have access to. Women’s contentment with 
their lot is likely to distort the ‘utility’ calculus (Sen, 1995: 259-265). Our focus in this paper is 
on the adaptation argument presented by Nussbaum (and as also by Sen)—i.e., the claim that 
modern values, such as the individual rights and socially atomistic kind of egalitarianism offered 
by western theorists (e.g., Nussbaum), cannot be objected to on grounds that Muslim women 
accept certain uniquely Islamic understandings of their role because those women have 
improperly adapted to their particular social setting. (There is, however, some empirical evidence 
to the contrary, e.g., Muslim women’s perspectives on their cultural and religious identity while 
living and working in Australia; see Syed & Pio, 2010). By “egalitarianism” here we mean not 
that men and women are equal in worth and dignity—a proposition that we believe to be 
common to most people and religious systems but rather that the societal roles of men and 
women should be exactly the same. Instead, we consider it more useful as well as legitimate to 
consider the development of women’s issues in Islam, on Islamic terms.  
 
We argue that modernity and its values clash with some interpretations of Islam with regard to 
questions of women’s employment. In fact, in some cases Muslim women themselves appear to 
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reject modernity in favor of a uniquely Islamic view of their status. One temptation—exercised 
by writers such as Nussbaum—is to dismiss the acceptance by Muslim women of an alternative 
(i.e., non-modern, pre-modern), uniquely Islamic view of their status. This is the adaptation 
argument about false consciousness in effect. However, we consider the adaptation argument as 
untenable. On this point Buckner (2009) argues that adaptive preference may be seen as 
regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. Buckner argues that many adaptive 
preferences that other scholars have cast out as irrational preferences may be seen as fully 
rational preferences worthy of pursuit by taking into account the agent’s own appraisal of the 
adaptive preference. 
 
Analogously, Hakim’s (1998; 1999, 2003) Preference Theory seeks both to explain and predict 
women’s choices regarding investment in productive or reproductive contributions to society. It 
suggests that women fall into three main groups: women who prefer a work-centered lifestyle, 
often remaining childless by choice (about 20 percent); women who prefer a home-centered 
lifestyle, often having many children and little paid work (also about 20 percent); and the 
remaining majority of women who are adaptive, combining paid work with raising children. 
Preference Theory is founded on the idea that modern family models are diversifying both in 
form and function, and that individual desires regarding family-work orientations need to be 
respected by the larger society. Family structures can be categorized as gender egalitarian, 
compromise or role segregated, but these labels focus on the relationship between husband and 
wife. It is also important to consider the work orientation of the female member of the marital 
relationship, as she is currently being held responsible for both work and home duties.  
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Sen’s notion of adaptation has been critiqued by Sugden (2006), who argues that the idea that 
“ethical theorists can claim to know better than some particular individual what is good for 
[him/] her seems to open the door to restrictions on freedom” (p. 34). Sugden cites Sen’s (1999) 
emphasis on individuals’ capability to lead the kind of lives they have reason to value. The 
“reason to value” formula is important for Sen because capability cannot be evaluated entirely by 
reference to an individual’s actual desires. Sen suggests that certain functionings are valuable to 
all human beings, whether they are desired or not. But Sen does not seem to evaluate a person’s 
capability in terms of a standard of value that is wholly external to her. Sen’s solution is to 
invoke a universalistic concept of “reason.” The suggestion is that the standard of value is one 
that, in the light of reason, each individual would endorse (Sugden, 2006: 37-38).  
 
Since Sen avoids making substantive claims about what people have reason to desire—in 
comparison to the more ambitious approach adopted by Nussbaum—Sugden (2006) uses 
Nussbaum’s (2000) texts to illustrate the scope that the capability approach offers for some 
people to impose on others their understanding of what is worthwhile in life. The core of 
Nussbaum’s work is a list of “central human capabilities,” which should be guaranteed to every 
individual. Sugden wonders if it is possible to accept the reality of adaptive desires without 
allowing collective judgments about rational desires to override individuals’ actual desires 
(Sugden, 2006: 41). He notes that Nussbaum is equally dismissive of the prospect of objection to 
her favored principles from the perspective of any particular religion: 
 
Given that the religion has agreed to sign on to a constitution of a certain type, it will 
have to figure out how to square this ‘overlapping consensus’ on public political matters 
of basic justice with the rest of what it teaches (Nussbaum, 2000: 232). 
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It seems that Nussbaum is not thinking about how to design a constitution that can be agreed to 
by everyone (or every religion), given one’s ideas about what is valuable. Indeed, it is unclear 
who the ‘”we” who will have to “figure out” how to square religion with the supposed 
overlapping political consensus on matters of political justice is in this context. Instead, she is 
imagining a world in which everyone has already agreed with her, a perspective that is quite 
problematic (Sugden, 2006: 51). Such an all-or-nothing approach to political matters and social 
mores is, we will argue in a subsequent section, inconsistent with a dialectical approach to 
understanding the relationships among religion, culture, and business. 
 
While Sen seems to be ambiguous or half-apologetic on his notion of social choice, Nussbaum 
(2001) considers her list of central human capabilities to be a free-standing “partial moral 
conception,” explicitly introduced for political purposes only and without any grounding in 
metaphysical ideas of the type that divide people along lines of culture and religion (p. 13). She 
suggests that it makes sense to take the issue of social justice seriously, and to use a norm of 
justice to assess the various nations of the world and their practices (p. 18). However, there are 
some obvious problems with such notion of “a norm of justice.” 
 
For example, adaptation is not always problematic. It can at times be an intelligent and free 
process, based on people’s social experiences and learning in life (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995). 
A predominantly negative picture of adaptation may result in discounting the role of individual 
agency in helping women and men actively identify and pursue their intelligent preferences in 
life. Previous research shows that subjective indicators play an important role in defining 
people’s well-being (Easterlin, 2003; Veenhoven, 2000; 2002). In other words, adaptation may 
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represent a dynamic process that can be deployed and interpreted in numerous ways. However, 
such interpretation would need to be based on an understanding of the context, taking into 
account issues of individual agency and social choice, something that may be hard to achieve 
through a universalistic notion of well-being. Indeed, there is always a possibility that some 
people—critics such as Nussbaum—plausibly could hold themselves aloof from their own 
adaptation and thus critique the adaptation of others. We now turn to a specific context, namely 
the role of women in Islamic societies. 
 
Instead of subscribing to the adaptation argument, we take a more nuanced view of the role of 
women in Islam, attending to its complexities and articulating how it has developed through a 
dialectical engagement with modernity (and how that engagement generates a sub-theme of 
contrasting versions of Islam itself, i.e., egalitarian vs. non-egalitarian Islam). This more 
complex view of women in Islamic society in turn may provide advice for the practice of 
business in a large part of the world, advice which would have been missed had we either simply 
rejected Islamic views as adaptation/false consciousness, or had we simply assumed a patriarchal 
caricature of Islam’s view of women. 
 
III. The role of women in Islam 
In this section, we provide an overview of the role of women in Islam in the light of the Quran 
and other Islamic texts. We also explain how the interpretation of the Quranic verses regarding 
the role of women remains subject to various historical and contextual influences. Like other 
religious traditions, Islam lends itself to multiple interpretations of doctrine that are plausible in 
different contexts. In the same way that there are multiple ways of being Christian, for example, 
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so are there multiple ways of being Islamic. As we will seek to demonstrate, the archetypical 
reading of Islam from outside the tradition with regard to the role of women is quite different 
than that offered by the Quran and enacted within much of the Islamic world.  
 
We acknowledge the fact that the actual text of the Quran is in Arabic, and thus there are some 
radical differences within Islam with respect to its interpretation and translation. Barlas (2002), 
for example, points towards the dominant patriarchal influences on Quranic interpretation and 
translation. In her own commentary on the Quran, Barlas challenges oppressive readings of the 
Quran and offers “a reading that confirms that Muslim women can struggle for equality from 
within the framework of the Quran’s teachings, contrary to what both conservative and 
progressive Muslims believe” (xi). What we seek to do is neither to read egalitarianism into the 
text where it is not present or to pick minority views of proper Quranic interpretation that fit our 
analysis, but rather to identify plausible egalitarian interpretations that demonstrate scholarly and 
popular (within some contexts) support for egalitarianism within Quranic interpretation and 
Islamic tradition. 
 
 
Egalitarian injunctions in the principal texts of Islam 
While the modern western discourse on women’s rights in the main emanated from the first 
wave feminism during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the UK and the US, 
the language of rights (haqq) in the Islamic literature can be traced to the seminal Islamic period 
and texts, almost 1400 years ago. The Quran2 declares the creation of opposite genders as a part 
of divine scheme, a matter of reflection (51:49, 36:36). The good deeds of all humans will be 
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rewarded irrespective of their gender (16:97). There are numerous verses in the Quran which 
establish equality between men and women. One such verse is: “O mankind! reverence your 
Guardian-Lord, who created you from a single person, created, of like nature, His mate, and from 
them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women;- reverence Allah, through whom ye 
demand your mutual (rights), and (reverence) the wombs (That bore you)” (4:1). It may be noted 
that the parentheses are used by translators to explain a point which is not too clear in literal 
translation of the Quran from Arabic to other languages. In other verses, the Quran says “Women 
have rights similar to the rights against them” (2:228). Women and men possess equal rights for 
work and compensation.” and “Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he/she 
male or female: you are members, one of another...” (3:195).  
 
Similar emphasis on women’s rights can be found in the hadith. For example, in his famous 
sermon at the eve of “the Farewell Pilgrimage” (632 A.D.), the Prophet particularly mentioned 
the special place for women in an Islamic society. Note that the Prophet used Arabic word haqq 
(right) to emphasize mutual rights of man and woman on each other: 
 
O People! It is true that you have certain rights with regard to your women but they also 
have rights over you…Do treat your women well and be kind to them for they are your 
partners and committed helpers (The Prophet’s last sermon, n.d.). 
 
However, the Quranic notion of equality appears to be based on gender differentiation, not on 
identicality. For example, Islam recognizes a woman’s economic rights, such as her right of 
inheritance, which is enshrined in her share of her parents’ as well as her husband’s properties, 
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according to Islamic sharia,3 though it is a man’s sole responsibility to provide adequate 
economic resources for his family including his wife and children (Hussain, 1987).4 It would 
appear that gender differentiation within Islam is itself socially constructed and changeable over 
time. According to Barlas (2006: 7): 
 
[T]he Quran does not even associate sex with gender. That is to say, it recognizes sexual 
(biological) differences but it does not assign them any gender symbolism. There is thus 
no concept of gendered man or woman in the Quran. Not a single verse links men and 
women to a specific division of labor or define their roles as a function of their biology, 
or say that biological differences make women and men unequal. 
 
Perhaps with an eye to improving individuals’ overall capabilities, Islam declares seeking 
education a religious duty, which is equally binding on women and men (Ibn Majah, 1952). 
Islam also allows women to be engaged in economic activities including operating their own 
businesses (Hassan, 1994). For example, Khadija, the Prophet Muhammad’s first and most 
revered wife was an eminent businessperson in Ancient Arabia. In fact, Muhammad was in her 
employ before marrying her (Syed & Ali, 2005). There are several similar examples in Islamic 
history which suggest that female companions of the Prophet used to be engaged in business 
activities in the city. The second caliph, Umar ibn Al-Khattab, appointed a woman, Ash-Shifaa’ 
bint Abdullah, as the supervisor of markets in Madinah. Certain other Muslim women such as 
Khaula, Lakhmia, Thaqafia, and Bint Makhramah traded perfumes. The wife of Abdullah ibn 
Mas’ud met her expenses by manufacturing and selling handicrafts. A female companion named 
Quila said to the Prophet, “I am a woman who buys and sells things.” Then she asked several 
questions about buying and selling. Thus, business was a legitimate activity of the female 
companions of the Prophet (Crescentlife, n.d.). Abu-Shuqqah (1990), an eminent contemporary 
scholar, mentions in his voluminous work, “Women’s Liberation at the Time of the Prophet,” 
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more than 300 authentic traditions of the Prophet that confirm women’s full participation in 
social activities during the Prophet’s time. 
 
Historical and contextual interpretations 
Mernissi (1996) has shown how many Muslim men tend to misread the verses that extended 
certain inalienable rights to women, e.g., women’s rights in marriage and also to own a property. 
By the third century after the Prophet, even the Quranic exegesis (tafsīr) showed that the 
egalitarianism once associated with Islam had lost its “subversive connotation.” This view 
appears to be consistent with the argument that the egalitarian impulse of any religious system 
loses steam as it becomes institutionalized (Anderson, 2004). 
 
Marlow (1997) argues that as early as the second century after the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic 
scholars had begun to weaken “the egalitarian impulse in various parts of tradition,” by justifying 
hierarchical models of family and tribal system in a society that was supposed to promote 
egalitarianism (p. 66). Islamic scholars who had “gained incontestable possession of the moral 
high ground” failed to “translate the anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian moral at the heart of 
their scholarly tradition into an active social and political opposition” (p. 93). Instead, they 
sought to justify those pre-dominant hierarchies and acted as subservient to patriarchal 
influences. This view is also shared by Al-Hibri (1982), who asserts that the institution of 
patriarchy co-opted Islam after the death of the Prophet.  
 
Other scholars (e.g., Armstrong, 1992; Lewis, 1995) have noted that Islam brought a general 
improvement in the position of women in ancient Arabia, e.g., Islam endowed women with rights 
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to property and inheritance, respect in social life, protection against ill treatment of their 
husbands. Islam prohibited the practice of female infanticide, which was previously sanctioned 
by customs in pagan Arabia. Armstrong (1992: 191) notes that: 
 
We must remember what life had been like for women in the pre-Islamic period when 
female infanticide was the norm and when women had no rights at all. Like slaves, 
women were treated as an inferior species who had no legal existence. In such a primitive 
world, what Muhammad achieved for women was extraordinary. The very idea that a 
woman could be witness or could inherit anything at all in her own right was astonishing. 
 
However, much of this impetus was lost and original message of Islam was modified “under the 
influence of pre-existing attitudes and customs” (Lewis, 1995: 210). Hussain (1987) argues that 
Islamic scholars in the classical age terminated the agency of the woman and, in order to guard 
her chastity as well as the chastity of man, segregated her entirely from male society. In that 
process, the woman was reduced to a mere sentinel of male chastity, a tradition amply reflected 
in strict institutions of seclusion and veiling. Mernissi (1987) argues that the Prophet’s efforts 
were aimed at renouncing the “phobic attitude” then prevailing toward women and that the 
Islamic message introduced hopes of gender equality in the treatment of women (p. 81). After 
the death of the Prophet “very quickly the misogynistic trend reasserted itself” (Mernissi, 1987: 
75). In order to rescue monotheism after the Prophet’s death, a compromise was deemed 
necessary with the Arab patriarchal tradition of that period. The male elite, including some 
within the Prophet’s companions, began to “fabricate” misogynistic hadith to their own benefit 
(Mernissi, 1991: 45-46).  
 
Islamic feminist interpretations 
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Islamic feminist scholars argue that the Arabic text of the Quran is “full of subtleties” open to 
both liberal and conservative interpretations (Minai, 1981: 20). Most Muslims do not understand 
Arabic and are dependent on Islamic scholars to develop an understanding of Islamic traditions. 
Furthermore, different readings of the same texts yield “fundamentally different Islams” 
(Ahmed, 1992). Thus, what Muslims read the Quran to be saying is a function of who reads it, 
how, in what contexts (Barlas, 2002), and also the ethos of the society in which the interpretation 
is embedded. 
 
Ahmed (1992) uses the Quran as a heuristic device to construct abstract egalitarian principles of 
the faith. Her interpretation gives prominence to the “egalitarian voice” of Islam and dismisses 
its “legal voice” as derived from the foreign (i.e. non-Islamic) patriarchal influences. Ahmed 
argues that the legal voice sanctified the subordinate position of women in the social-legal 
edifice of Islam. In support of her argument, Ahmed highlights the fact that in the years 
immediately after the death of Muhammad, women such as Ayesha and Umm-Salma played a 
key role in transmitting the hadith and were among the authors of the verbal texts of Islam 
(Ahmed, 1992: 64, 73). She argues the egalitarian voices of Islam were largely silenced under 
the influences of various patriarchal cultures of the conquered lands where the Muslim Arabs 
were assimilated and adopted the traditions of the dominant classes. 
 
Barlas (2001) notes that the Quran treats women and men as equal yet diverse. She refers to an 
emerging consensus among feminists that simple equality principles have “proven inadequate for 
feminist practice” especially in the “area of sexuality” (Miles, 1996: 49). However, in her 
treatment of gender diversity in the Quranic teachings, Bralas does not use “different” to imply 
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“unequal.” She points to a growing literature that suggests that treating women and men as 
diverse human beings with diverse roles does not in itself amount to treating them unequally, 
particularly if differences in treatment are not premised in claims about sexual (biological) 
differentiation (Hekman, 1990; Keddie, 1996).  
 
Islam absolves women, in general, of economic responsibility within the household, an option 
which is left to the woman’s personal choice and circumstances. Women’s free choice to 
participate in economic activities or to concentrate on their domestic duties is, however, in stark 
contrast to men’s position in Islam. For men, economic activities are not a matter of choice but a 
religious responsibility (Hussain, 1987).5 Islamic feminists such as al-Hibri (1982) and Hassan 
(1999) acknowledge the Quranic description of men as qawwamun (breadwinners or those who 
provide a means of support or livelihood). Thus clearly Islamic traditions place a high value on 
individuals’ family-related roles, particularly on women’s roles as mothers.  
 
Because women are not religiously duty bound to economically support their families, they are 
generally less likely to seek paid jobs unless forced by their special circumstances or for personal 
fulfillment. For example, in their study of working women in Iran, Ghorbani and Tung (2007) 
suggest that since more women work part-time in order to take care of their families, this 
exacerbates income disparity. This suggests that female economic activity rates, particularly 
when such rates are biased toward work in the formal sector of the economy, may prove an 
inadequate means of judging gender equality in an Islamic context. An adequate measure could 
be the one which does not confine evaluation of gender equality in the domain of economic 
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organization but takes a holistic, context-specific view of the definition and measurement of 
gender equality (Syed, 2008). 
 
The workplace roles held by Muslim women today 
However, it must be acknowledged that, over many centuries, the special protective provisions 
for women have, under the patriarchal influences that pervade the Islamic faith, tended to result 
in religious practices that are particularly disadvantageous to working women (Ali, 2013; Barlas, 
2001; Hassan, 1994). A narrow interpretation of female modesty and gender segregation has 
historically resulted in Muslim women’s confinement within the four walls of their houses, such 
as in Pakistan and India (Syed, Ali, & Winstanley, 2005). Consequently, working women in 
MMCs are more likely than their sisters in the west to face gender discrimination in the labor 
market.  
 
Mernissi (1996) argues that the institution of paid employment in Muslim societies, Arab 
countries in particular, is a traditional domain of men, who consider it a matter of religious duty 
as well as male pride to support their wives. It is not unusual to find men who feel “insulted if 
one asks them whether their wives work outside the home” (p. 64). A woman in paid 
employment is a traumatizing idea for such men, particularly those from lower literacy 
backgrounds. A narrow interpretation of Islamic female modesty has particularly served to 
remove women from the public space including paid employment. Ali (2000) notes that general 
and vaguely phrased Quranic verses regarding modesty in behavior have been interpreted in a 
variety of ways by male Muslim scholars, “a process that many writers believe [has] led to an 
ever-increasing exclusion of Muslim women from the public sphere of life” (p. 76). Such 
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patriarchal traditions seem to pose a major challenge to women’s freedom and capability, 
including their freedom to pursue professional careers in Muslim societies.  
 
Thus, despite the cultural differences that distinguish countries from Malaysia to Bangladesh and 
from Pakistan to Iran to Saudi Arabia, and all across Africa, a patriarchal interpretation of 
religion is practiced in most of these societies, with varying degrees of restrictions on women’s 
mobility and employment. Indeed, there is an internal diversity even within the known Islamic 
sharia-based societies such as Saudi Arabia, where women are not allowed to drive cars, and 
Iran, where women are accepted in the air force and a woman currently holds the position of 
vice-president of that country. Ghorbani and Tung (2007) demonstrate that some factors 
contributing to a glass ceiling faced by working women in Iran are universal, i.e. are not unique 
to Islamic societies, while other factors are specific to the institutional/socio-cultural context of 
that country.  
 
There is some macro-level evidence to suggest that the way women are treated in MMCs, 
including in workplaces, remains predominantly influenced by local interpretations of and 
approaches towards Islam. For example, Iran is one such country where the Shi’ite Islamic 
institution of ijtihad (critical interpretation of religion) seems to have resulted in better 
opportunities for women at least in relation to the status of women in the Sunni or Wahhabi 
dominated Saudi Arabia or the Taliban’s Afghanistan. Women in Iran are reported to hold 
important positions in universities, in government jobs, in culture and other fields. They’ve 
entered the workplace as business owners, doctors, and cab drivers and they’ve become involved 
in politics (Zind, 2009). The Iranian census (2006) shows that the female share of the labor force 
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is about 20 percent. About one third of Iran’s female labor force is in professional jobs, 
concentrated in education, healthcare, and social services. About 50 percent of the female work 
force is in professional and technical employment (54.5 percent with executive positions 
included) (Moghadam, 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Iranian government takes 
particular care to facilitate working women’s family responsibilities. For instance, if a woman 
has a baby, she can go home early, and her wages will not be cut. She can also take six months 
leave with pay. There is also a considerable female participation in politics. Furthermore, 
contrary to the popular belief, most of the universities in Iran are co-educational. Until class five, 
education is compulsory and free up to the college level. After completing high school in the 
rural areas, there are hostels in the city where students can go and continue their studies. Adults 
are also encouraged to study and facilities are provided to them. While there were fewer women 
in higher education before the Islamic revolution, now there are 67 percent women in higher 
educational institutions as compared to 33 percent men. This also means that there is likely to be 
a greater representation of women in parliament and in the workplace in the near future (Hyder, 
2008).  
 
Bangladesh offers another example of an MMC in which the socially acceptable roles of women 
have expanded. Labor force participation rates for females in Bangladesh increased sharply from 
8 percent in FY1984 to 29.2 percent in FY2006. Every year 600,000 women are added to the 
labor force. With gender parity in primary and secondary education, more educated women are 
joining the labor force (Hua, 2008). It may be noted that since its independence from the 
“Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” Bangladesh chose “People’s Republic of Bangladesh” as its 
official title, possibly indicating its inclination towards a secular and more inclusive version of 
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Islam and the state. This inclusive stance may be seen as contributing to the enhancement of 
women’s status in Bangladesh, and indeed Bangladeshi politics have been dominated by two 
women who have taken turns serving as prime minister. The newly independent state in 1971 
had a dream of a new society, for which the state created a Constitution that focused on 
principles of equality and liberty. An egalitarian understanding of Islam, it would appear, then 
enabled the state to proceed to ratify several international conventions and participate in 
international conferences for women (WB, 2008). 
 
Movements for reform within Islam 
The foregoing discussion suggests that, in terms of gender relations in Islam, the real challenge 
lies in how narrow and patriarchal interpretations and practices of religion could be reformed to 
bring about gender equality. Of course, the definition of “gender equality” is itself socially 
constructed, and what would appear to be from a western and/or secular perspective to be typical 
of patriarchy would be understood quite differently by both women and men within the Islamic 
context. Beeku and Badawi (2005) insist that normative Islam rejects sexism in business as well 
as in other areas of life. (Normative Islam is what Muhammad as a Prophet revealed through the 
Quran and also through the examples he gave in words and deeds. However, given the 
differences of opinion regarding interpretations of the Quran and the hadith, normative Islam 
remain a contestable goal which different interpretations are trying to reach.)  Beeku and Badawi 
note that piety, not gender, is the only legitimate basis for superiority within normative Islam 
(Quran, 49: 13). Yet, it is common knowledge that Islam’s normative teachings are 
inconsistently followed in the Muslim world; they are usually set aside either by an extremely 
conservative approach or by cultural bias (UNDP, 2002).  
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Islamic feminists have argued for the need to unread patriarchy from the Quranic interpretations. 
While their arguments remain hotly contested in the “mainstream” or “male-stream” Islamic 
scholarship, there appears an ever increasing number of Islamic feminist voices from within the 
pale of Islam. Barlas (2002), for example, has endeavored to recover the scriptural basis of 
gender equality in Islam through un-reading patriarchy from the Quranic interpretations. She 
offers a compelling argument about why Islam is not a patriarchy and why Muslim women and 
men can struggle for equality from within an Islamic framework. Barlas argues that the reason 
Muslims have failed to read the Quran as an anti-patriarchal text has to do with “who has read it 
(basically men), the contexts in which they have read it (basically patriarchal), and the method 
by which they have read it (basically one that ignores the hermeneutic and theological principles 
that the Quran suggests for its own reading)” (p.1). 
 
Mernissi (1987) has exposed the ideological links between the Islamic normative system and the 
practices of patriarchy. She argues that historical Islam has deeply ingrained the fear of female 
sexuality in the male consciousness. Mernissi describes patriarchy in Islam as an organized 
system which treats gender equality as violation of Islam’s (pre-supposed) premise that women 
must remain under the authority of a male relative (father or husband) and that they must be 
spatially or socially confined and excluded from matters other than those pertaining to family 
(Mernissi, 1987: 19). Similarly, Hussain (1987: 4-9) argues that the Quranic verses “men are a 
degree above women” (2: 228) and that “men are in charge of women” (4: 34) only refer to 
man’s position as head of the family consisting of his wife and children, whom he is duty bound 
to maintain. The additional charge, however, increases man’s liabilities towards woman, makes 
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woman immune from financial liabilities thus magnifying her importance as a human being. 
Hussain argues that a woman has like a man “an independent individuality and is economically, 
socially and politically identifiable as an entity different from her husband, father or son with 
right to own property, earn money, vote at elections, hold electoral or other public offices, and 
protect her legal and constitutional rights or interests” (p.1). Hussain concludes that instead of 
being subject to the rule of segregation imposed on her by social customs, a woman may appear 
in public in modest dress, with her face unveiled and hands open. We now turn to a critique of 
the capability approach and offer a dialectical approach to analyzing the role of women within 
Islam, with particular attention to what our analysis indicates for businesses seeking to act 
ethically within an Islamic context. 
 
IV. Dialectical analysis and the role of women in Islam 
We start our analysis here with a restatement of the problems with the capability approach vis-à-
vis the role of women and Islam. We have noted that the capability approach is implicitly built 
on a western and secular perspective, which creates the possibility of cultural imperialism if 
applied uncritically. Further, the capability approach fails to account for the choices that people 
within Islamic societies freely make. Any assumption that women within Islamic societies make 
choices based on a supposed false consciousness that allows them to engage in adaptation in 
order to feel better about their subjugation may oversimplify the relevant issues while imposing 
an external perspective on another culture and religious system. A more nuanced analysis that 
accounts for differences across Islamic cultures and insights from the capability approach offers 
a better way forward. 
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However, an honest interpretation of Islamic tradition does indicate that there are real differences 
in how the acceptable roles of women are defined, although such definitions differ across MMCs 
and are generally changing within the Islamic world. One way to bring together the capability 
approach and the Islamic tradition is through dialectical analysis (Benson; 1977; Seo & Creed, 
2002). Through dialectical analysis, a mutual critique between the capability approach and the 
Islamic tradition can occur that allows for a new synthesis and framework for understanding the 
economic roles of women within Islamic societies.  
 
Benson (1977) proposes four basic principles of dialectical analysis: 
1. Social construction, which is the social process through which orderly and 
predictable relations are produced and reproduced; 
2. Totality, which represents the interconnectedness of these built up social 
patterns; 
3. Contradiction, in which various ruptures occur and inconsistencies among and 
within established social arrangements are found; 
4. Praxis, the free and creative reconstruction of social patterns on the basis of a 
reasoned analysis of both the limits and potentials of present social forms. 
 
The key advantage of dialectical analysis in the present context is that it defines social roles and 
cultural understandings as socially determined. No society, culture, or religious tradition is static. 
Rather, the taken-for-granted patterns of interactions at one point in time change—albeit 
slowly—as new insights emerge based on ruptures and contradictions within the society. Seo and 
Creed highlight the particular importance of contradiction and praxis with regard to creating 
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institutional change (see Figure 2A, p. 232). We, therefore, propose that institutional 
contradictions between patriarchal readings of Islam and (educational and economic) institutions 
that support an expanded role for women do (and will) generate a new praxis and associated 
institutional change, although at different speeds in different Islamic societies.  
 
In order to understand how this process might occur, we now introduce the ideas of symbolic 
traditionalism and pragmatic egalitarianism introduced by Gallagher and Smith (1999). In their 
study of American evangelical Christianity, Gallagher and Smith found that evangelicals (the 
subset of Christians who espouse more conservative interpretations of the Bible) combined 
elements of traditional gender roles with pragmatic concerns about supporting the family 
financially. They found generally that “both women and men saw men as ultimately being 
responsible for the family, a responsibility that ought to earn men the respect and deference of 
their wives and children” (p. 217). Like Islamic tradition, male responsibility in the economic 
sphere and in the governance of the home is widely agreed upon within American 
evangelicalism. 
 
However, Gallagher and Smith also found a high degree of pragmatism among American 
evangelicals, both men and women. Economic realities in the United States often require 
families to earn two incomes in order to make ends meet. (Gallagher and Smith do not address 
the issue of women’s capabilities being a rationale for the paid work of women, which as we will 
argue contributes to how women’s roles within Islamic societies are changing.) Evangelical men 
and women account for this seeming contradiction—men are responsible for material wellbeing 
but women often need to work—by emphasizing accountability for spiritual welfare and 
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governance of the home as a male responsibility and deemphasizing men’s roles as sources of 
financial support for wives and families. The symbols of male headship—leading prayers, 
making decisions about what to do with the household’s incomes—remain as guiding principles 
that are to be honored by both men and women in this context, at least rhetorically. However, 
Gallagher and Smith also note that women’s employment may itself “be transformative, 
reshaping the practice of gender within evangelical families” (p. 225). Women’s paid 
employment outside the home thus reshapes their understandings of what is and is not acceptable 
with regard to gender roles. However, it is not necessary for either women or men to use the 
language of gender equality for there to be increasing gender equality.  
 
Thus, we propose that it is entirely possible for someone (or for that matter, an institution) to be 
rhetorically in favor of male headship and practically close to egalitarianism. Households, much 
like organizations, religious systems, and societies, will often tend towards a pragmatic approach 
in solving issues such as gender roles. While robust rhetoric in favor of gender egalitarianism in 
all spheres of society may feel satisfying (particularly to outsiders), it may not always be the best 
approach to bring about social change. Rather, our approach is consistent with both the freedom 
of societies to define what is meaningful and appropriate while also making provision for 
accommodation to wider social trends and interactions with other social actors. In this way it is 
also consistent with the dialectical approach we previously outlined. Our point is not that 
activism and advocacy of gender egalitarianism is wrong or inherently imperialistic from an 
ethical or a cultural standpoint. Rather, we first propose that ethical analyses of gender 
egalitarianism (or for that matter, other ethical issues which interact with cultural and religious 
systems) must be sensitive to local differences in how people define meaning. Second, from the 
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standpoint of creating social change, approaches that are more pragmatic and dialectical are more 
likely to be successful than approaches that rely on confrontation. 
 
We think that the distinction between symbolic traditionalism and pragmatic egalitarianism is 
helpful for understanding how the capability approach and Islamic tradition might critique each 
other and thus bring about a new synthesis with regard to gender roles. We start with the 
proposition that social construction and totality with regard to gender roles within Islamic 
societies has traditionally supported a role for women that largely excluded their participation in 
the economic sphere. However, as have we pointed out, much of what has been traditionally cast 
as the orthodox interpretation of the Quran with regard to gender roles has been based less on a 
balanced interpretation of the Quran as it is written and more based on cultural traditions outside 
of the text. (We note that a selective and patriarchal reading of the New Testament of the 
Christian scriptures might lead to a similar conclusion about women’s roles; see for example, St. 
Paul’s letter to the Ephesians as an example of a text that has been lifted out of context to justify 
female subjugation; Wills, 2006). 
 
What has been and is occurring within Islamic societies is contradiction, the third part of 
Benson’s dialectical framework. Contradiction has been occurring in two ways. First, there has 
been a recovery of the latent egalitarian ideas within the Quran, which have been deemphasized 
within much of the dominant patriarchal theology. However, the inherent contradiction of not 
including the Quran’s ideas about gender egalitarianism has become exposed by both theologians 
working within the tradition and by the recognition of women’s capabilities in the economic 
sphere. Further, to varying degrees Islamic societies have been affected by the global feminist 
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movement. However, some of the freedoms inherent to the capability approach are not suitable 
for the Islamic context; for example, sexual freedom. Other parts of the capability approach, such 
as economic opportunity, are increasingly compatible with Islamic tradition as that tradition is 
being reinterpreted by theologians and individual men and women. When businesses provide 
economic opportunities to women, they are contributing to the process of contradiction that in 
turns leads to a new synthesis. 
 
The effects of contradiction—cast by Benson as praxis—will not lead to discarding Islamic 
tradition or to conceptual gender equality as it would be conceptualized within western, 
Christian, or secular societies. Rather, the parts of the capability approach that are most suitable 
for Islamic societies—mostly focused on specifically economic roles—are likely to integrate, 
albeit at different speeds and to different extents based on how different countries currently 
conceptualize the “appropriate” role of women. However, we would propose that for many 
societies the outcome observed with American evangelicalism—symbolic traditionalism and 
pragmatic egalitarianism—is likely to occur. Modesty of dress is one element of symbolic 
traditionalism that is likely to remain, along with the rhetoric (and perhaps the reality) of male 
headship within the home. However, outside of symbolic traditionalism, women’s capabilities 
will allow them greater economic roles that are nevertheless consistent with Islamic culture and 
the mainstream readings of the Quran.  
 
In short, moves toward gender equality are likely to continue within the Islamic context, albeit at 
different rates and in different forms in different MMCs. This is not to say that gender equality 
will be conceptualized in the same way that it is in the United States and Europe; this is unlikely 
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to occur in the near or even distant future. However, we have noted that the latent egalitarianism 
and effects of ideas like the capability approach do have (potential) effects on gender roles 
within the Islamic world, although these effects will unfold differently across countries. The 
balance that one society strikes between symbolic traditionalism and pragmatic egalitarianism 
will be different than that struck by another society, but both balances might well be consistent 
with Quranic interpretation and the broad outlines of the capability approach. 
 
We also note our analysis offers an implicit critique of the capability approach. We previously 
noted that the capability approach is implicitly built on a western and secular understanding of 
politics and ethics, with a potential to render “other” intelligent understandings and forms of 
gender equality as forced “adaptation.” Just as patriarchy is increasingly being unread out of 
Islamic theology, so must a western and secular bias be unread out of the capability approach. 
Some elements of the capability approach will be applicable to all societal contexts and others 
will not.  
 
V.  Effects of this analysis on businesses operating within Islamic societies 
We conclude with a discussion of how our analysis might affect businesses operating within 
Islamic societies. First, we suggest that if the adaptation thesis is in part wrong, there are 
significant implications for corporations as they address cultural conflicts. Second, we suggest 
that corporations may play a role with regard to engagement with Islam during the process of 
dialectical development previously discussed. In this section we analyze two distinct issues 
within Islam as they relate to women’s employment: the veiling of women, and work-life 
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balance. Veiling deals with how women choose to present themselves. Work-life balance 
implicates gendered relations in the home as they affect women’s lives in the workplace.  
 
We have previously discussed the adaptation thesis at length, suggesting that one of the concerns 
that it raises in an Islamic context is that it implicitly privileges western and individualistic 
understandings of the choices that women and men should make. Following Sugden (2006), we 
propose that avoiding paternalism with regard to what choices are acceptable helps corporate 
decision makers better understand how to interact with belief systems that are seemingly foreign 
to them. Choices about how to present oneself in public—as is the case for various gradations of 
female veiling—are deeply personal and often connected to religiously informed beliefs about 
modesty. Interestingly, in a later book about religious intolerance and fear, Nussbaum (2012: 
128, emphasis added) in advocating for broad freedom from women to veil themselves stated 
that “[o]ne thing that Americans and Europeans need to face squarely is the fact that some people 
do actually choose lives involving authority and constraint.”  
 
Although a company headquartered outside of the United States and operating in an Islamic 
society might not expect that female veiling to be “typical” of the self-presentation of women, 
veiling should not be prohibited by that company. On matters such as self-presentation and 
dress—especially when they are connected to religious understandings—companies should give 
as much latitude as is practical. On this point Moore (2007) notes that the meaning that Muslim 
women themselves ascribe to veiling (female modesty, adherence to religious beliefs) is often 
quite different than that ascribed by outsiders to Islam (subjugation of women). Our critique of 
the adaptation approach suggests that while the practice of veiling may be seen by some as 
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evidence of female subjugation and patriarchy, Muslim women who perceive that veiling is 
consistent with their religious identity should have the freedom to do so in the workplace—no 
matter how such choices might be perceived by others. An organization wanting to forbid or 
limit female veiling on the grounds that it would affect business operations would face a high 
burden of proof. Rather, a company wanting to promote equality for women in the MMC context 
should “create ample opportunities for them, and see what they actually do” (Nussbaum, 2012: 
127) rather than forbid veiling or ascribe patriarchal meaning to the practice. 
 
Similarly, with regard to work-life balance, there may be conflicts about the understanding of the 
“proper” role of women, both at home and in the workplace, between Islamic and non-Islamic 
societies. We noted previously that within Islam, the role of women as mothers is paramount and 
that Quranic notions of equality are based on gender differentiation rather than strict equivalence 
of roles within the home. An approach to understanding work-life balance built on an adaptation 
analysis would negatively cast the choices of women to balance work and family in ways that 
place the latter as primary as evidence of patriarchy. Our analysis offers a different conclusion:  
such choices can be understood as being made freely by women if they are based on their self-
chosen religious identities. Muslim women might make different choices about work-life balance 
based on their self-definition as Islamic, and organizations have obligations to honor those 
choices. This might mean, for example, that the definition of “gender discrimination” used in 
western societies would have commonalities and differences when applied in an Islamic context. 
For example, discrimination against women would be wrong in both contexts, but organizations 
might need to offer Muslim women reasonable accommodations that allow them to balance 
home and work. 
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We conclude with an analysis of the role corporations should (and should not) play with regard 
to promote gender equality within Islamic societies. Scherer and Palazzo (2007) draw a contrast 
between positivist and post-positivist schools of corporate social responsibility, criticizing 
positivist CSR because of its instrumental focus and lack of normative sophistication and post-
positivist CSR because of its relativism and utopianism. They propose that corporations instead 
become political actors in a globalizing society, suggesting that (2007: 1098) “they are not just 
addressees of regulation but also authors of rules with public impact. Applied to CSR, this means 
that the issue is not so much the realization of an ideal speech situation within processes of 
corporate decision making as it is the embedding of the corporation in democratic processes of 
defining rules and tackling global political challenges.” In their institutional perspective on 
gendering CSR in Arab Middle East, Karam and Jamali (2013: 61) argue that while it may be 
“unrealistic to expect too much of CSR, it is also unreasonable to expect too little”. The authors 
acknowledge the role of CSR as an important building block of the more interconnected and 
egalitarian societies in that region. 
Such a role for corporations may be seen as attractive by some, particularly with regard to topics 
such as gender. We noted earlier that a dialectical analysis of the relationship between Islam and 
gender roles likely over time will lead to a new synthesis in which women’s roles in Islamic 
societies will change in ways that bring about greater economic participation. Such a perspective 
might be seen as consistent with Scherer and Palazzo’s (2007: 1009) proposal that “[s]ome 
corporations do not simply follow powerful external expectations by complying with societal 
standards in legal and moral terms; they engage in discourses that aim at setting or redefining 
those standards and expectations in a changing, globalizing world and assume an enlarged 
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political co-responsibility.” However, we note that there are some important differences between 
our account of dialectical processes and the political role of the corporation that arises from the 
Habermasian perspective of Scherer and Palazzo. 
  
The essential difference, we propose, is the role of the corporation and whether it is a leading or 
supporting role. As we have noted, there is a discourse within Islam about the appropriate role of 
women, and this discourse will continue as Islamic societies interact with a globalizing world. 
Through their business activities and the perspectives they bring when they operate in Islamic 
societies, corporations implicitly are participating in that discourse. Consistent with their values 
and business goals, corporations may want to be supportive of egalitarian impulses within the 
societies in which they are operating. When it is possible to do so, the political role of the 
corporation can thus be to strategically engage with Islam and Islamic societies in ways that are 
supportive of gender egalitarianism, but not to take a leading role of pressing the dialogue or 
seeking social change. There is a danger that corporations that will take it upon themselves to try 
to construct other societies—with values that those societies have chosen—in their own images 
without regard for the choices that societies, Islamic and otherwise, have made.   
 
While we acknowledge that Islamic societies are continually revisiting their own choices about 
gender roles, those choices are not a fait accompli. If business necessity, Muslim women’s 
personal choices, and Islamic hermeneutics all support more egalitarian gender roles, then 
supporting them may not tantamount to an imposition of foreign values or a skirmish in the war 
of civilizations. Indeed, while we have argued that corporations should not deny Muslim women 
the opportunity to live and work according to their faith, it is important to consider whether 
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corporations should comply with and even enforce a prevailing local norm that curtails women’s 
liberties, especially if local women chafe against that norm. For instance, should a corporation 
enforce a local custom or law that requires women to wear the hijab, if some of that 
corporation’s women employees do not find legitimate religious grounds to do so? Should a 
corporation honor local norms dictating that women employees serve only women customers, or 
that women hold no formal administrative authority over men? We argue that, in such instances, 
the heterogeneity of local norms and employee preferences may be accommodated, without 
allowing any single group or ideology, foreign or local, to infringe the personal space and judge 
the ethical conduct of others. 
 
Indeed, the imposition of values from the outside, either directly or through undue participation 
in Islamic discourse, might backfire and make gender egalitarianism seem to be a western idea, 
when as we have noted, there are egalitarian movements within Islam and support for gender 
egalitarianism within the Quran. In short, the economic role of women should not become 
another front in a supposed war of civilizations in which the welfare of women themselves are an 
afterthought. Here Spivak (1988: 310) notes that it is possible that in the debate “between 
patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the women 
disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced 
figuration of the ‘third-world woman’ caught between tradition and modernization.” In seeking 
to promote gender egalitarianism within Islamic societies, corporations should not seek to play 
such a central role that the free choices of women (and men) within those societies are not lost, 
thus relegating the wishes of women to the sideline.  
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have sought to provide a more nuanced perspective on gender roles within the 
Islamic world. There is an egalitarian tradition within Islamic theology, much of which is only 
recently being recovered and used within MMCs. There is an increasing recognition of women’s 
capabilities within and across Islamic societies. Women and men within Islamic societies are 
thus making pragmatic and personally faithful choices about the appropriate roles of women and 
men in the economic, social, and household spheres. Businesses therefore can and should operate 
in ways that are culturally appropriate and consistent with the economic capabilities of women. 
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